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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The convention closed with a banquet and dance at the
Finlen Hotel, Saturday night.
THE FEASIBILITY OF REQUIRING PRESENTATION OF
PURELY CONTINGENT CLAIMS IN PROBATE
Practitioners in the field of probate administration often
encounter a problem of considerable difficulty in the matter
of presentation of contingent claims. Claims which are fixed,
whether matured, unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated give
little or no trouble. They must be presented within the non-
claim period or they are barred. Difficulty arises, however,
when the court is called upon to determine the applicability of
non-claim statutes to a contingent claim. Such statutes are
of substantially two types: those generally requiring creditors
to present "all claims" and those requiring presentment of
"all claims whether due, not due, or contingent." Legislation
which merely provides that "all claims" shall be presented
may be interpreted by the court as not requiring the presenta-
tion of contingent claims. Atkinson indicates that this is the
usual interpretation of such statutes.' At common law, a con-
tingent interest was so nebulous as to be lacking in many of the
incidents of property. However, states having the latter type of
statute have much more trouble construing their statute so as
not to include contingent claims. These non-claim statutes
have the effect of a special statute of limitations and if the
claims are not presented within the time allowed,2 they are
barred forever.
The Montana statute reads that all claims arising upon
contracts, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
must be presented within the time limited in the notice,
and any claim not so presented is barred forever In con-
nection with this statute, attention should be called to
another which states that no holder of any claim against
an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the
claim is first presented to the executor or administrator.'
In Nathan v. Freeman the Montana Supreme Court held
that a contingent claim on the executory contract in suit need
not be presented before action is brought thereon against the
estate. In that case, a lessee took a lease of real property to be
used as a motion picture theater. It was agreed that after the
11 AnKmisoN, WiLLs (lst ed. 1937) §237, p. 656.
*The time expressed in the notice must be ten months after its first
publication when the estate exceeds in value the sum of ten thousand
dollars, and four months when it does not. R.C.M. 1935, §10171.
'R.C.M. 1935, §10173. (Same as Cal. Prob. Code 1937, §707; and Cal. C.
Civ. Proc. 1923, §1493).
'R.C.M. 1935, §10180. (Same as Cal. C. Civ. Proc. 1923. §1500).
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termination of the lease, the lessee would restore the property to
its original condition as it was before the alteration. The lessee
died before such termination and the lessor brought action for
breach of contract without presenting his claim in probate. The
Court held that such a claim was not required to be presented
saying that R.C.M. 10173 refers only to indebtedness of a de-
ceased person, contracted by him during his lifetime, and then
existing!
However, California Courts on similar facts have held that
such claims must be presented within the time allowed under
penalty of being forever barred. In Verdier v. Roach the lessor
covenanted to indemnify the lessee from damage by water dur-
ing the lease term. The lessor died and a claim for damages
accrued thereafter and after the time to present claims had ex-
pired. The Court held this to be a contingent claim which must
be presented and was therefore barred.' In another California
case a contractor agreed to indemnify and save the plaintiff
harmless against claims arising out of the work performed.
The plaintiff presented a claim against the contractor's estate
within the time allowed although a claim on the contract had
not yet arisen. The Court held that such presentation was
proper.'
Utah follows the California decisions saying that such
contingent claims must be presented or they are barred. This
was the language used where an agent was to manage a build-
ing and collect rents for a ten year period at an agreed com-
pensation and after four years, the principal died. After the
period for filing claims had expired, the executor breached the
contract by discharging the agent. It was held that the
agent's action on such breach was barred although, during
the running of the non-claim period, he had no reason to be-
lieve that the executor would breach the contract
North Dakota' and most of the states having statutes like
Montana's agree that contingent claims must be presented al-
though they have not become absolute and are not liquidated
in amount."
"(1924) 70 Mont. 259, 225 P. 1015.
*(1892) 96 Cal. 467, 31 P. 554.
7Southern Pac. Co. v. Catucci (1941) 47 Cal. App. (2d) 596, 118 P.
(2d) 494.
OHalloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath (1927) 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342.
*Johnson v. Larson (1927) 56 N.D. 207. 216 N.W. 895; Graber v. Bon-
trager (1939) 69 N.D. 300, 285 N.W. 865.
"li ATrINSON, WrLLS (1st ed. 1937) §237, v. 656.
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Minnesota" and Oklahoma,' in accord with Montana, have
held that some contingent claims need not be presented.
All these states have statutes substantially the same as
Montana's' and thus the difference in decisions turns in some
little measure on statutory construction.
Montana interprets section 10173 as meaning that claims
existing before death must be presented and those arising after
death need not be. "Claim" has reference only to those which
existed against the decedent lessee at the time of his death, not
to those subsequently arising during the administration of
his estate." Claims under the non-claim statutes are such as
exist "at the time of the death of the deceased" or grow out
of a contract, act, or omission of a decedent during his life-
time.2 The statute is treated as referring to a contingency
based on the act of the deceased. The word "arising" seems
to be treated as requiring the claim to be in existence ht
death. The distinction is pointed out in the principal case, the
Montana Court illustrating by saying that the statute would be
applicable to rentals to become due under a lease after the
death of the lessee being "a claim arising upon a contract...
not due."' Minnesota and Oklahoma follow this interpreta-
tion.
California, however, makes no such distinction. It takes
the very literal interpretation as do the states concurring with
its decisions. They do not consider the words "claims" and
"arising" as determinative as Montana does but, instead, all
the weight of the statute seems to be placed on the word "con-
tingent." Webster defines contingent as depending on some-
thing that may or may not occur. Nebraska says that a con-
tingent claim against an estate is one where liability depends
on a future contingent event rendering it wholly uncertain
whether there ever will be a liability." Woerner states that a
"contingent claim is where the liability depends upon some fu-
ture event, which may, or may not, happen, and therefore
makes it wholly uncertain whether liability will ever arise.""
"Hantzch v. Massolt (1895) 61 Minn. 361, 63 N.W. 1069; McKeen v.
Waldron (1879) 25 Minn. 466.
"O'Neill et al v. Lauderdale (1921) 80 OkL 170. 195 P. 121.
"Minn. C. Civ. Proc. 1921, 18812; N.D. C. Civ. Proc. 1913, 18736; OkL C.
Civ. Proc. 1921, §1234; Utah C. Civ. Proc. 1933, §102-9-4.
"Nathan v. Freeman, supra, note 5.
"Dodson v. Nevitt (1885) 5 Mont. 518, 6 P. 358.
"Nathan v. Freeman, supra, note 5.
"Parker v. Luehrmann (1934) 126 Neb. 1, 252 N.W. 402.
s2 Wo xER, Am.E LAW OF ADMINXSTRATIONi (3rd ed. 1923) 5394 p.
1276.
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In the light of these definitions and the wording of the
statutes, it is not at all difficult to follow the California Court's
reasoning.
The rule that the construction placed on a statute by the
highest Court of another state from which it was borrowed,
before it was adopted in Montana, is controlling here, will not
be followed if the decision construing it be not founded upon
correct reasoning." The reasoning of the California Court is
treated as incorrect for Montana's purposes, sense of justice
and logic. It is true that Montana probably felt constrained
to administer, as the Utah Court put it,' "abstract justice in
the case notwithstanding the plain, unambiguous words of the
statute," but justice it certainly is. The plaintiff has a lawful
claim which should be satisfied.
Some Courts draw an analogy between bankruptcy and
probate proceedings as to presenting contingent claims of this
nature and reason somewhat on the order that where a claim
must be presented in bankruptcy, so should a like claim be
presented under the non-claim statute. But upon a close study
of the two proceedings, it will be seen that they are different
in this respect. A determination in bankruptcy on this point
should not rule in probate. The purposes of the two proceed-
ings and the reasons for requiring presentment are quite dif-
ferent. Bankruptcy is primarily for the purpose of discharg-
ing an honest debtor and at the same time paying all creditors,
whose claims would be discharged, at least their pro rata share.
In order to effect a discharge and thus give the debtor a new
start, it is necessary that most claims be treated as provable
since those not so treated are not discharged. There is more
reason too from the creditor's standpoint for letting one with
a contingent claim come in since there might never be any
other assets and he should get his share. The bankrupt is dis-
charged from all provable debts and since this includes con-
tingent liabilities, they are discharged in bankruptcy." Al-
though these aims prevail, still the bankruptcy Court won't al-
low such a claim if it is not capable of liquidation or of reason-
able estimation or if such liquidation or estimation would un-
duly delay the administration of the estate or any proceeding
under the act.'
"Leffek v. Leudeman (1933) 95 Mont. 457, 27 P. (2d) 51L
'See Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, supra, note 8, 349.
"In re Tastyeast Inc. (C.C.A. 3rd, 1942) 126 Fed. (2d) 879.
22,Bankrupt Act of 1898 as Amended by Chandler Act, (1938) 557 (d),
V. 51.
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The purpose of administration of a decedent's property
is to collect the assets, pay deceased's creditors from the
amount so realized, and distribute the balance to persons en-
titled thereto under the will or intestate laws." Presentation
of claims is intended to bring about the expeditious and ef-
ficient settlement of estates."4 It is designed for the protec-
tion of the estate and all interested therein and to compel
those having claims against the estate to present them within
a limited time in order that the estate may be closed up speed-
ily. The purpose is that the administrator may be apprised
of the facts so that he may act advisedly in passing upon the
merits of the claim presented." The Idaho Supreme Court
states that the purpose of requiring the presentation of claims
against estates is, first, to furnish the administrator with
pertinent evidence touching the validity and justice of such
claims, by which means he may determine whether they ought
to be paid out of the funds of the estate, and second, to enable
him to justify his acts, in some measure at least, in accounting
with the probate Court." Requiring such purely contingent
claims to be presented seems to run counter to the aim of a
speedy and efficient administration. Time would be lost in
attempting to determine the worth of such a claim and the
administrator would certainly be more troubled in adminis-
tration if all contingent claims had to be contended with. The
ones discussed in this treatise might well be incapable of satis-
factory liquidation, and money or property would possibly be
lying idle in Court awaiting the maturing of a contingency.
Even in a bankruptcy Court a contingent claim will not be
allowed when it will unduly delay the administration of the
estate and in that proceeding, contrary to probate, the creditor
may never have another chance to get satisfaction. There is
no guarantee that the bankrupt will ever again get assets
which one with a non-discharged claim will be entitled to ap-
ply to his claim.
After an estate is administered through probate proceed-
ings, that is not the end to the property since it is still in exist-
ence so that the creditor can get at it when his claim matures.
Under some circumstances, the holder may maintain an action
against the legatees, devisees, next of kin, or heirs, to the ex-
'SJones v. Peabody (1935) 182 Wash. 148, 45 P. (2d) 915, 100 A.L.R. 64.
"State ex rel. Steinfort v. District Court (1940) 111 Mont. 216. 107 P.
(2d) 890.
'Nevin-Frank Co. v. Hubert (1923) 67 Mont. 50, 214 P. 957.
wFlynn v. Driscoll (1924) 38 Idaho 545, 223 P. 524: See also 41 A.L.R.
145.
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tent that they have shared in the estate.' An eminent author-
ity has said that the remedy of a creditor whose right of action
accrued after the time in which claims may be presented
against the estate while under administration is generally in
equity or in some states at law, and may be enforced against
distributees to the extent of the property received by them.'
Given some development of this device, it is believed that it
would admirably take care of the problem of contingent claims.
Thus there would be no danger that the creditor would not be
reimbursed. The contingent creditor would also be more cer-
tain of recovering the full amount of his claim since it is quite
possible and very probable that the court might underestimate
the worth of the contingent claim in setting aside the amount
in court to cover it when it becomes absolute. Where the
statutory remedy doesn't adequately cover the situation, a
Court of equity has undoubted jurisdiction to adjudicate the
future claim and order sufficient assets retained by the repre-
sentative on distribution of the estate to discharge it when
due." By this it appears that the creditor could choose be-
tween this equitable remedy before the administration of the
estate is completed and a legal remedy thereafter against the
heirs, devisees, and legatees when the claim becomes due."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court suggests a remedy along this
line saying that the weight of authority is to the effect that
where a claim against the estate does not accrue or become
enforceable until after the administration of the estate which
has been distributed and passed into the hands of the heirs, its
collection may be enforced by a direct action in the District
Court, against the heirs of the deceased, and they may be held
"McKeen v. Waldron, supra, note 11. Under some statutes it must be
presented to the probate court if the holder wants to look directly to
the assets of the estate for payment instead of pursuing the personal
representative. Gross v. Thornson's Estate (1918) 286 Ill. 185, 121
N.E. 600.
B3 WoEamNs AMa. LAW or ADMNISTRATiON (3rd ed. 1923) §579, p. 1982.
"Petrie v. Voorhees (1867) 18 N.J. Eq. 285: Banker's Surety Co. v.
Meyer (1912) 205 N.Y. 219, 98 N.E. 399, Ann Cas. 1913D 1218.
OIf the creditor would choose the equitable remedy, it would probably
be because the value of the claim is easily estimated otherwise he
would wait until it matures. Having this choice, he would be assured
of a recourse. As to the adequacy of the legal remedy being a bar to
equitable action, the creditor should be able to show. when necessary,
that the legal remedy as to him is inadequate because of waiting too
long, probability of not getting anything, or the ike and thus get the
estimated amount into Court awaiting maturity of his claim. To
make it more certain, such choice and election could be incorporated
into the statutes.
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liable to the extent of the assets received by them from the
estate.3'
Is this not then the better procedure? Atkinson believes
that there is every reason why, a Court should construe its
statutes if possible so as not to require the presentment of
purely contingent claims. The devices to secure the payment
of unmatured claims are scarcely applicable. It would be
burdensome and might be impossible to require the legatees
to give bond for the satisfaction of such claims as is done to
satisfy unmatured claims which are fixed. It would be unrea-
sonable to postpone the final settlement of the estate until the
contingency has occurred for this may not happen until many
years after decedent's death, or indeed may never take place.
Moreover even a careful holder of a contingent claim would
scarcely present or file it where, as in the Utah case, he had no
means of knowing that the executor would discharge him on
his ten year contract after the non-claim period had run. And
so also it could be reasoned as to the holder of a warranty
deed, a guaranty or a bond the breach of which has not yet oc-
curred during the non-claim period. Finally if such claims are
filed, their number and tentative nature might cause per-
plexities in the administration to no practical advantage. The
Montana Court, in speaking of the California decision of Verdier
v. Roach, gave some more reasons: There is no way on earth
by which the happening of the event could have been antici-
pated, nor by which the possibility of its occurrence could
have been foreseen, nor was it possible in advance to deter-
mine the nature, character or extent of the resulting damage.
We cannot and will not give indorsement to such a construc-
tion of the statute.' California" has said that it is quite as
important that contingent claims should be presented for al-
lowance as that absolute claims should be presented; otherwise
provision cannot be made for them before the estate is set-
tled;' timely notice of all claims which may prejudicially
affect the estate should be given, so that the administrator may
have an opportunity to investigate their merits and contest
OO'Neill v. Lauderdale, 8upra, note 12.
11 ATKINSON, Wnis (1st ed. 1937) §237, p. 657.
"See Nathan v. Freeman, supra, note 5, 270.
"See Verdier v. Roach, supra, note 6, 558.8By not requiring purely contingent claims to be presented and by giv-
ing the creditor the election between an equitable remedy before ad-
ministration is completed, to estimate the amount of his claim and im-
pound such amount in Court, and the legal remedy against the heirs
after administration of the estate, there is no need that provision be
made for them before the estate is settled.
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them, if advisable, before evidence of their invalidity shall be
lost; no greater hardship results from barring contingent
claims if not presented within the time prescribed by law, than
results from barring absolute claims. But with due respect to
the California Court and granting the hardship in both in-
stances, one is normally less likely to present a purely con-
tingent claim than an absolute one whether for lack of knowl-
edge of the law or a feeling that one has no claim until breach
and the claim becomes fixed.
The Montana reasoning seems more just in view of the
fact that the amount cannot be definitely determined and thus
it is necessary for the creditor to rely on the estimate given
by the Court. This might very easily and often does result in
his getting a proportionally slight amount in probate adminis-
tration. An example of this is in a bankruptcy case where the
bankrupt's contingent interest in a trust estate was sought to
be sold under execution to satisfy his debts. Under the law of
Maryland, this could not be done and the court commented
on the wisdom of this rule saying his interest was entirely
speculative depending on his surviving his mother and no one
is willing to pay any considerable amount. The trust property
had a value of many thousand dollars and under a sale, in-
valid by Maryland law, the bankrupt's contingent interest was
sold for the paltry sum of $325. The Court further said that
it is unjust to seize and destroy an interest which is so uncer-
tain and contingent that it cannot be fairly sold or appraised."
The same applies in probate proceedings when it is necessary
for the Court to determine the value of a highly speculative
contingent claim. Waiting until the contingency occurs and
then bringing suit for that definite amount would be to the
best interest of the creditor and since the heir shouldn't get
clear title to the decedent's property until all claims are paid
out of it, such heir would not be out anything.
The statutes have hit upon a middle ground between
Civil' and Common Law" liability of the heirs and devisees
now allowing recovery only to the amount of property received
"See Suskin & Berry Inc. v. Rumley (C.C.A. 8th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 304.
"1 ATviNsow, Wuis (1st ed. 1937) 1198, . 528. At Civil Law the heir
steps in place of the ancestor at once with the latter's full rights and
burdens and the additional obligation of paying legatees according to
the latter's will. If the heir takes as universal successor, he must
pay all debts although they may exceed the value of the estate.
'I GARDNER, WILUS (2nd ed. 1916) 6162, p. 529. At the Common Law
the debts of the testator was payable only from his personal property
unless, by the will, the realty was charged therewith.
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by them" so there is no hardship on them in allowing the hold-
er of a purely contingent claim to bring suit against them when
it becomes due.
Utah recognizes the need for a change in their decisions
but states that it is a matter of a change in legislation.' The
Montana decision that the non-claim statute has no applica-
tion to claims arising out of contracts executory at the time of
death finds support as regards contingent claims dependent
on the happening of some event in the future in the Minne-
sota cases. But for the broad proposition in the main opinion
that the statute has no application to claims arising subsequent
to the death of the contracting party because of existing ex-
ecutory contracts, there seems to be no other authority." Mon-
tana apparently stands alone on this broad proposition as to
claims arising under executory contracts, finding partial sup-
port in the Minnesota and Oklahoma cases previously cited.
Perhaps the Court in the principal case did not intend that its
language should be taken so broadly as is indicated. Since an
executory contract by operation of law becomes the obligation
of the personal representative and he may be made to pay
damages for breach thereof out of the estate," this seems to
lend support to the position taken in Montana. In addition,
this should be more reason for not requiring presentment of
purely contingent claims since one could easily rely on this
operation of the law and thus wait for a breach and consequent
suit for damages.
A much better practice would be to omit the requirement
that such purely contingent claims, like those discussed in this
comment, be presented and to permit suit against the devisees,
legatees, and such others as receive the decedent's property,
after the contingency has occurred if such happens after the
administration is completed. This remedy is often allowed
either by statute or upon equitable principals.' Montana also
"Under statutes, all the property passes subject to the debts of the
ancestor, excepting so far as personal exemptions are made e.g. home-
stead. O'Neill v. Lauderdale. supra, note 12.
'Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, supra, note 8.
"144 A.L.R. 149.
"Nathan v. Freeman, supra, note 5: Janin v. Browne (1881) 59 Cal. 37;
McCann v. Pennie (1893) 100 Cal. 547, 35 P. 158: 1 AZrxnisoN, WILLS
(1st ed. 1937), §226, p. 618; 11 Cal. Jur. 970: 24 C.J. 53.
"Parks v. Murphy (1924) 166 Ark. 564, 266 S.W. 673: Zollickoffer v.
Seth (1876) 44 Md. 359: Forbes v. Harrington (1898) 171 Mass. 386,
50 N.E. 641: O'Neill v. Lauderdale, supra, note 12; State v. Burnes
(1908) 129 Mo. App. 474, 107 S.W. 1094: Chitty v. Gillett (1915) 46
Okl. 724, 148 P. 1048, L.R.A. 1916A 1181: Logan v. Dixon (1889) 73
Wisc. 533. 41 N.W. 713.
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seems to contemplate such in its statute providing that no suit
shall be brought against devisees and legatees to contribute
to payment of a claim by excepting from the operation thereof,
creditors whose claims were not due ten months before the
day of settlement or whose claims were contingent and did
not become absolute ten months before such day."
It is believed that good legislation on this point should
provide that: All absolute claims whether matured or unma-
tured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall be presented within
ten months or be forever barred. Claims which are contingent
as of the date of death of the deceased and which become ab-
solute within the ten month's period shall be presented as
fixed claims or be forever barred. If such contingent claims
become absolute after the ten month period but before the
estate is settled, they may be presented as a claim against
the estate subject to the right of the personal representative
to reject the claim on the ground of undue delay and embar-
rassment to him in the final administration of the estate. If
such contingent claims becoming absolute after the ten month
period are presented and rejected or if not presented to the
administrator, suit may be brought against the heirs, devisees
and legatees, each being held according to the proportion of
the decedent's property each received.
DONALD E. RONISH.
"R.C.M. 1935, 10314. When the accounts of the administrator or execu-
tor have been settled, and an order made for the payment of debts and
distribution of the estate, no creditor, whose claim was not included
in the order for payment, has any right to call upon the creditors who
have been paid, or upon the heirs, devisees, or legatees, to contribute
to the payment of his claim; but if the executor or administrator has
failed to give the notice to the creditors, as prescribed in section 10171,
such creditor may recover on the bond of the executor or administrator
the amount of his claim or such part thereof as he would have been
entitled to, had it been allowed. This section shall not apply to any
creditor whose claim was not due ten months before the day of settle-
ment, or whose claim was contingent, and did not become absolute ten
months before such day
EFFECT OF PRIOR CONTRADITORY STATEMENTS
IN IMPEACHMENT
The unorthodox view,' that prior self-contradictory state-
ments are not only admissable for impeachment purposes but also
as evidence of the fact contained in the prior statement, was
adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Jolly."
The defendant was being prosecuted for receiving stolen
'3 WIGmomo, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1018, p. 687.2(1941) 112 Mont. 352, 116 P(2d) 686. -:
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